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CHAPTER 24 




In his introduction to Covering Islam (1997), Edward Said refers to the “information wars that 
have gone on since 1948 around the whole question of the Middle East.”1 He is particularly 
concerned with the way in which the Lebanese-based Shi’a group Hizbollah (Party of God) “who 
identify themselves and are perceived locally as resistance fighters” are “commonly referred to 
in the American media as terrorists.”2 In an effort to thwart such assertions, Hizbollah3 instituted 
a savvy media strategy “to produce and articulate a conscious and forceful self-image”4 of 
themselves not as terrorists but as resistance fighters and statesmen. The major focus of this 
chapter is the way in which Hizbollah have wielded their television station, al-Manar—the 
‘Beacon’ or ‘Lighthouse,’ in Arabic—as a weapon in their information war. The argument put 
forward here is that Hizbollah have met with high levels of success in this regard—to the extent 
that they may recently be seen to have become the victims of their own success, with the 
institution of multiple bans on transmission of al-Manar globally and the repeated targeting of 
the station by Israeli forces during the summer 2006 crisis. On the other hand, these difficulties 
may also be viewed by the organization as blessings in disguise, as they have forced the station 
to streamline its processes which may, in the long term, not only ensure its continued existence, 
but even allow it to access a larger audience.  
The first section of this chapter briefly describes the range of media products offered by 
Hizbollah, while section two gives a brief overview of the Lebanese television scene and the 
establishment of al-Manar. The third and fourth sections detail the station’s mission and 
financing, respectively. Section five, which describes and analyzes the station’s programming, is 
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divided into three parts: the first explores the type of programming prevalent in the station’s 
early years, the second describes the station’s contemporary format, and the third is devoted to a 
description of the type of viewing offered by the station to women and children. The station’s 
viewership figures are briefly explored in section six, while section seven explores the recent 
banning of the station in Europe and the United States. The final section is devoted to an analysis 
of the role of the station in the Lebanese crisis of 2006.  
 
Hizbollah’s Range of Media Products  
Autonomous communication has long been a paramount objective for Hizbollah. The group’s 
weekly newspaper, Al-Ahed (The Pledge), was launched on 13 June, 1984, and was followed by 
the weeklies Al Bilad, Al Wahda, El Ismailya, and the monthly Al Sabil. Hizbollah’s radio 
station, Al-Nour (The Light), was founded during the Amal-Hizbollah conflict in 1988, when a 
group of young Hizbollah fighters spontaneously began broadcasting news of the clashes. In 
terms of Hizbollah’s Internet presence, they first went online in early 1996. The Central Press 
Office site, or Hizbollah.org, is the group’s official homepage, and is available in both English 
and Arabic. Hizbollah maintains three other major websites (all of which are available in both 
English and Arabic versions): http://www.moqawama.net, known as the “Islamic Resistance 
Support Association” and which describes the group’s attacks on Israeli targets; 
http://www.nasrollah.net, the official homepage of the group’s leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah; 
and http://www.manartv.com.lb, the news and information site that is essentially the homepage 
of al-Manar Television.5 There is no question, however, that the “jewel in Hizbollah’s media 
crown”6 is the al-Manar television station itself. Live footage of Hizbollah operations appeared 
for the first time in 1986, with coverage of the invasion of the Israeli-occupied Sujud fort at the 
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top of Jabal Safi hill in south Lebanon, and was distributed to those Lebanese television stations 
in operation at that time. According to Naim Qassem, Hizbollah’s deputy Secretary General, 
“[f]ollowing the first television broadcast of this operation, the camera became an essential 
element in all resistance operations.”7 The establishment of al-Manar followed shortly thereafter: 
its first broadcast was Ayatollah Khomeini’s funeral in June 1989.8  
 
The Lebanese Television Scene and the Establishment of al-Manar 
A majority of the factions involved in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) established television 
stations during the conflict with, at one point, some 50 land-based stations in operation. After the 
war it was decided to regulate these, and the number of stations thus decreased to a dozen or so.9 
In terms of the provision of licenses, “the selection was made only on sectarian grounds, and all 
licenses were given to members of the government or their relatives, hence privileging 
sectarianism over professionalism.”10 Al-Manar was not amongst the stations that received 
permission to continue broadcasting, nor was Télé-Lumière, the station belonging to the 
Maronite Christian Church, but both continued to do so nonetheless. When other religiously 
oriented stations began to be set up, the government agreed to grant a license to both stations in 
order to dissuade other channels from following what Firmo-Fontan describes as “their 
subversive precedent.”11 Al-Manar thus became an official member of the Lebanese television 
community in 1996, and on 5 April, 2000 the Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed to allow Al-
Manar Television to launch satellite transmissions.  
Hizbollah denies that it controls al-Manar. However, most of the station’s shareholders 
and staff are members of Hizbollah, which has its headquarters just around the corner from the 
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al-Manar building in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and the station is widely viewed as 
Hizbollah’s mouthpiece.12 Al-Manar’s Director General Abdallah Qasir insists that  
Hizbollah has no direct organizational relationship with the station, but is rather 
its partner. Several members of the board of directors are party members, while 
others are not. Some channel workers might agree with the party through the 
general outlines of their political, religious and social principles. This, however, 
does not mean that Al-Manar is a party channel.13  
 
Ibrahim Farahat, the station’s Public Relations officer, has made similar remarks.14  
 
Mission 
On its website, al-Manar is described as “a Lebanese TV station . . . motivated by the ambitions 
of participation in building [a] better future for the Arab and Muslim generations by focusing on 
the tolerant values of Islam and promoting the culture of dialogue and cooperation among the 
followers of the Heavenly religions and human civilizations.” Although at one time the station 
was also described on the site as the “first Arab establishment to stage an effective psychological 
warfare against the Zionist enemy,” this particular claim has since been removed,15 and today the 
station claims instead to be “the true reflection of what each and every Muslim and Arab thinks 
and believes in.”16 “Al-Manar is a Lebanese channel first of all,” reiterates Farahat.17 And indeed 
at the core of the station’s programming appears to be a consistent discourse constructed around 
the notion of moqawama (resistance) against occupation. Hizbollah’s mission and identity are 
certainly rooted in its founders’ belief that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 could only be 
overcome by armed resistance. The low-intensity warfare characteristic of the 1990s and the 
Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000 notwithstanding, the notion of resistance 
remains central to Hizbollah’s self-proclaimed mission.18 Al-Manar thus gears its messages 
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towards encouraging attitudes which spur action and involvement in that resistance. According 
to Baylouny, these messages center on  
- Palestine, including American bias in the Arab-Israeli conflict,  
- the continuing threat posed by Israel,  
- the power and importance of community solidarity, and  
- pride in Arab culture and the achievements of the Islamic Resistance (i.e., Hizbollah’s 
armed wing). 
These messages have strong resonance not just amongst Lebanese, but in the Arab and Muslim 
worlds more generally.19 
 
Financing 
In 2004, Jorisch put al-Manar’s annual budget at U.S.$15 million, which at that time would have 
been approximately half the size of al-Jazeera’s budget.20 Numerous analysts contend that al-
Manar receives the bulk of its funding from Iran,21 but the station’s managers deny this, saying 
they fully comply with Lebanese television licensing law, which prohibits foreign funding. The 
station is said to receive monetary support from donors and shareholders, while the station’s 
Director General, Qasir, claims that the channel is largely self-financed through advertising 
revenue and the sale of programs: “Al-Manar produces from 80 to 85% of what it broadcasts. 
We also receive some aid through special sponsorships of religious programs, which are 
sponsored by the so-called Religious Rights (Al-Huquq al-Shar'iyah) [sic]. We also generate 
considerable revenues from the dubbing and redistribution of Iranian programs.”22  
Advertising revenues are somewhat circumscribed, as al-Manar does not accept 
advertisements for liquor or other “un-Islamic products,”23 which allegedly results in the station 
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turning down some 90% of potential advertisers.24 Until 2004, commercials only appeared on the 
land-based and not the satellite station. Among these advertisers were major American and 
European companies. However, this “support” of Hizbollah was brought to the attention of the 
U.S. Congress, which accused the companies of aiding terrorism, and the American and many 
European advertisers subsequently withdrew their advertisements.
 
Currently, advertisements on 
al-Manar are infrequent and relatively few in number, airing mainly at primetime. The majority 
are for local and regionally based companies and products. On the land-based station, 
advertisements are for local clothes, shoe, and toy stores, along with other retail stores and a 
Lebanese mobile phone company, while advertisements for cleaning detergents, air conditioning 
products, and food products are also featured. Non-veiled women appear in a number of these 
segments. The station also airs announcements for Hizbollah-run social service organizations and 
schools, computer and Koran classes, and sports clubs.25  
 
Description of Programming 
The Station’s Early Years 
“Symbolism and the projection of messages to internal and external audiences have occupied a 
central place for Hizbollah throughout its evolution.”26 In his Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman 
recounts how, during the crisis precipitated by the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985, 
Hizbollah deftly manipulated the U.S. television networks: “There were graduates of media 
studies from American colleges at meetings at Nabih Berri’s house in West Beirut while [‘spin 
doctoring’] tactics were being worked out.”27 Later, during the 1990s, Hizbollah utilized its 
media apparatus to wage successful campaigns against both the IDF and South Lebanese Army 
(SLA) when they adopted a two-pronged military strategy, combining guerrilla and 
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psychological warfare. According to Schliefer, “Hizbollah’s unique contribution to PSYOP lay 
in the way it combined conventional and psychological warfare, creating a whole new PSYOP 
idiom.”28 Al-Manar was at the center of this campaign from its inception.  
In terms of Hizbollah’s offensive against the SLA, a campaign of psychological warfare 
was waged in conjunction with improved armed operations against SLA units. Infiltration within 
SLA ranks was subject to particular exploitation by the group, who capitalized on deteriorating 
SLA morale by regularly publicizing and distributing the names of SLA officers with promises 
of punishment, while at the same time televising daily broadcasts encouraging Shi’a SLA 
soldiers to desert and lacing these pleas with promises of financial remuneration coupled with 
pardons. Hizbollah even established a special information unit which highlighted SLA soldiers 
returning to their families.29 
The group also waged an effective psychological warfare campaign against IDF soldiers 
serving in South Lebanon prior to their withdrawal in 2000. It utilized its own camera crews to 
record the efficiency of its attacks against IDF posts, which it then broadcast on al-Manar and, on 
a number of occasions, distributed to foreign media. The video-taping and dissemination of 
daring resistance operations served not only to boost the morale of Hizbollah’s own fighters and 
supporters, but also undermined SLA and IDF morale when the latter were, in a number of 
instances, caught on camera fleeing from advancing Hizbollah fighters. The group also regularly 
publicized on its television station and its websites the acquisition of new and upgraded 
weaponry in an effort to instill a degree of uncertainty into IDF units without actually having to 
employ the actual hardware, and broadcast messages in Hebrew to Israelis who could receive al-
Manar just across the border, asking mothers of Israeli soldiers to entreat their sons to come 
home.30 
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The station was also watched by the group’s supporters, of course, and Hizbollah was 
determined to prove the effectiveness of its resistance against the Israeli occupation to this 
constituency. Al-Manar was at this time dominated by religious programs. The pictures and 
names of deceased fighters were regularly screened, supported by verses from the Quran which 
glorified martyrdom.31 The purpose, according to Hala Jaber, was “to indoctrinate the minds of 
young and old alike with the idea that those who seek martyrdom will be rewarded with more 
pleasure than can ever be achieved during this earthly lifetime.”32 Jaber goes on to dismiss the 
suggestion that social welfare services provided by the organization were dependent on those in 
receipt of such services and their families serving in the resistance, pointing out that Hizbollah’s 
fighters had gained the status of national heroes, and that this was underlined in TV broadcasts, 
thus making the latter a much more likely tool of recruitment than welfare services.33 In 1997, 




The initiation of the Second Palestinian Intifada on 28 September 2000 came just four months 
after Israel ended its 18-year military occupation of South Lebanon with the upshot—according 
to numerous analysts35—that al-Manar’s main purpose from late 2000 onward was less the 
demoralization of an Israeli audience and more the assistance of the Palestinians in their struggle, 
along with the raising of awareness in Lebanon of the need to support the Palestinians against the 
Israeli government:  
The outbreak of violence in the Palestinian territories presented the new raison 
d’etre the TV station managers had been looking for—and also reflected the 
chronic need of Hizbollah as a radical movement to re-invent its agenda and claim 
to legitimacy within the domestic Lebanese political mosaic . . . . Early in 2001, 
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Hizbollah’s deputy chairman, Sheikh Na’im Qasim, said that: ‘Al-Manar is the 
television of the Intifada, in the same manner that it had been the medium of the 
resistance. It is now to be the television of this sacred cause.’36  
 
Prior to the outbreak of the Second Intifada, al-Manar was broadcasting for just four hours per 
day; with the upsurge in violence, however, station executives decided to increase airtime by 14 
hours daily, reaching a total of 18 hours of programming per day.37  
In terms of al-Manar’s contemporary programming, live news reports, video-clips, and 
“resistance” songs—including some 50 specially composed for the Intifada—are slotted between 
quiz shows, documentaries, and calls to prayer.38 Shows produced in-house include such 
programs as “Zajal Is Lebanon,” a folklore show that specializes in Zajal verse—a kind of local 
popular lyric verse—which spotlights distinguished Lebanese Zajal bands, while Kil Shi Ilu Shi 
(“Something for Everything”) is a social comedy that is composed of short sketches that 
comment on the contemporary political and social situation within Lebanon and the Arab world 
more broadly. Another home-produced show is Habbat Misk (“Musk Seed”), which is a satire by 
actor Wisam Sabbagh (Abu Shafiq) that deals with daily social, educational, and political issues. 
It has two segments: the first is filmed outside, and the second is broadcast live from the studio, 
where Sabbagh takes calls from the audience and answers their questions in a dramatic way and 
with commentary. Other popular Manar-produced programs include Al-Hal Bil-Qanun (“Legal 
Solution”), which is devoted to discussion of legal issues with lawyers and judges, and is 
presented by the lawyer Husayn Nasir and Wijhat Nazar (“Viewpoint”), a talk show presented by 
Mariam Karnib, who raises social, psychological, and educational problems that touch the core 
of people’s everyday lives.39 
In addition to these, al-Manar also broadcasts programs aimed at informing viewers about 
the nature of Israeli and American society and politics. Harb and Leenders describe Hizbollah’s 
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interest in the historical evolution of its main enemy, Israel, as particularly obsessive. The 
channel frequently broadcasts footage of Israeli politicians and journalist discussing the latest in 
Israeli politics, for example, while in-house commentators explain the workings of the Israeli 
parliament in voting for or against Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians. One of al-Manar’s 
primetime game shows, al-Muhimma (“The Mission”), seeks to virtually enter Jerusalem by 
answering a series of questions dealing with resistance operations, Islamic thought, the 
Palestinian cause, Western conspiracies, Israeli plots, etc. In this show, the Israeli enemy is 
challenged through the audiovisual presentation of the merely virtual possibility of conquering 
Jerusalem, while knowledge about the “enemy” (and other oppressors) is celebrated and 
rewarded. This knowledge is also materially re-channelled into promoting the cause of armed 
resistance, since a quarter of the jackpot awarded to the winning candidate is sent to aid in the 
Palestinian Intifada.40  
 Much of the “filler” between programs is also concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and it is via this “filler” that the basic character of the station mainly comes through, 
according to Baylouny.41 One such clip urges Palestinians to follow Hizbollah’s lead by standing 
up to Israel, as Hizbollah guerrillas did in south Lebanon, while another points out that Arab 
states number 300 million people while in occupied Palestine there are only five million Jews, 
and follows up with the question: “What are you waiting for?”42 A number of these 
transmissions are also in Hebrew; one of the most prominent of these messages is a video clip 
that sarcastically advises Israelis to leave for Europe and the United States, because those areas 
are safer for them than the Palestinian territories.43 Some clips also address the American 
involvement in the conflict, with one clip depicting the Statue of Liberty as a skeleton, 
brandishing a blade dripping with blood. 
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Women & Children 
Television viewing is important to women in the Muslim world because of their relatively higher 
rates of illiteracy.44 Al-Manar’s female audience is clearly important to them, and women are 
very visible on the station, composing at least half of the announcers and program hosts. In fact, 
the channel’s English-language broadcasting department has a majority of women working as 
reporters, presenters, and political analysts. Female presenters include Safa Muslmany, Wafa 
Hoteit, Btoul Ayoub, Fatima Bdeir and Myriam Karnib, all of whom have played a leading role 
in the development of the channel. These all wear the hijab (a scarf covering the hair) and 
manteau (a floor-length coat), and thus no parts of these women’s’ bodies other than hands and 
faces are visible to viewers. However, not all the women appearing on programs—as audience 
members, for example—are veiled; advertisements also show unveiled women, though all of 
these are conservatively dressed.45 Firmo-Fontan suggests, “the fact that women presenters wear 
the manteau and hejab, as opposed to the chador,46 can be interpreted as an initiative on the 
channel’s part to avoid antagonizing more liberal viewers and to appeal to all viewers of the 
Lebanese population.”47 Al-Manar has a wide following among Hizbollah women, who tune in 
to a range of soap operas (selected on moral grounds), talk shows, game shows, and news. Al-
Manar’s following is less obvious amongst non-Hizbollah women but, according to Firmo-
Fontan, is still significant, especially in the realm of news and children’s programs.48 
The station’s children’s programming tends to focus on and reiterate the need for 
“resistance” in much the same fashion as much of the adult-oriented programming. Asdiqa’ al-
manar (“Friends of al-Manar”) is a game show set as a pretend war game, with youngsters from 
10-15 years old fighting with pretend weapons (guns, grenades, swords, arrows) against an 
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enemy with a “Western” appearance (which is understood to be Israeli). The children, Shi’a and 
Palestinians from the camps, shout Allah Akhbar (God is Great) as they cross over outdoor 
terrain to meet the enemy across a bridge. Another series, Fatat al-muqawam al-Quds 
(“Jerusalem Resistance Boy”), involves a young boy who wants to find his father who went 
missing in a war. To do so, he learns to fly planes, starting with paper airplanes and eventually 
graduating to lessons at a flying school. Unable to find his father, he joins Hizbollah’s military 
wing and tries to recruit his friends into the organization also. Although religion is not mentioned 
in the series, the boy’s mother is depicted traditionally dressed, and is shown praising him for his 
choices and advising her daughters to stay clear of western influences and keep to the southern 
and rural areas instead.49  
 
Ratings/Audience 
Al-Manar is one of the top-ranked stations in the Arab world, and often pointed to as being in the 
vanguard of a new and independent media. At the 2001 
 
Cairo Television and Radio Festival, al-
Manar won the most awards of all the competitors. The Lebanese Media Group, which includes 
al-Manar and al-Nour radio won four and nine awards respectively.50 Al-Manar is one of the 
prime sources of news in the Arab world, particularly about Palestine. The top four news stations 
in the region, which capture 70-80% of satellite viewers, are al-Manar, al-Jazeera, LBC 
(Lebanese Broadcasting Company) and Abu Dhabi TV. According to the Jerusalem Media 
Communication Center, the majority of Palestinians watch al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi, and al-Manar, 
with the latter particularly widely watched in the West Bank and Gaza, where it has a number of 
correspondents.51 Jorisch reports a poll in 2003 which found TV viewers in Jordan turned first to 
al-Manar for news of Palestine (28%), followed closely by al-Jazeera (27.5%).52 In Lebanon, 
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where al-Manar ranks fifth among the country’s nine stations, its news bulletins are popular 
because they are deemed to be the most reliable and balanced on local politics.53 Indeed al-
Manar has been described as exceptional in Lebanese television because it displays “civic 
commitment,”54 in the sense that it addresses the concerns of ordinary people rather than a 
political elite.55 With the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 and the launch of its 
satellite channel the same year, al-Manar took its message to a wider audience, both regionally 
and internationally. Some estimates put its audience in 2003-2004 at 10 million viewers 
worldwide.56 It is difficult to estimate current viewership, however, as a result of the bans on 
transmission of al-Manar instituted in various jurisdictions since 2004.  
 
The Bans 
The campaign to have al-Manar banned from transmitting via satellite began with an opinion 
piece that appeared in the Los Angeles Times in October 2002. The article, penned by Avi Jorisch 
(the author of Beacon of Hatred), accused American companies who advertised on the station of 
promoting terrorism.
 
The Pepsi Company, Proctor and Gamble, Western Union, and a number of 
other major U.S. and European companies were named as advertisers on al-Manar’s local 
broadcasts (the satellite broadcast was, at that time, commercial free).57 Jorisch followed up with 
a letter to the U.S. Congress asking elected representatives to put pressure on these companies, 
and using the opinion piece as support.
 
The majority of U.S. advertisers duly pulled out, and 
pressure to ban the transmission of the station itself increased. The Coalition Against Terrorist 
Media (CATM), an offshoot of the U.S.-based neo-Conservative organization Foundation for 
Defence of Democracy (FDD), was also founded at this time in order to generate further 
momentum for a ban. Representatives of FDD and CATM—including Jorisch, who came on 
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board as the latter’s Executive Director—have issued numerous statements claiming “Al-Manar 
runs graphic videos encouraging viewers, even children, to become suicide bombers and calls for 
acts of terrorism against civilians . . . Al-Manar is an operational weapon in the hands of one of 
the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations.”58  
Al-Manar was, at the same time, coming under pressure in Europe. While claims about 
incitement to suicide bombing are contested, this is not to deny that some measure of al-Manar’s 
programming is objectionable by Western standards. The Washington Post has, for example, 
linked al-Manar to a rumor, widely spread in the Middle East, that Israel was behind the 9/11 
attacks and that Jews working in the World Trade Center had been alerted not to come to work 
that day. Shortly after the attacks, the Post reported that “As far as can be established, the story 
of 4,000 Jewish survivors originated with a September 17 [2001] report by the Beirut-based Al 
Manar television network . . . [which] cited ‘Arab diplomatic sources’ quoted in an obscure 
Jordanian newspaper named Al Watan.”59 The French move against al-Manar began after the 
station caused an uproar in October 2002 by broadcasting a Syrian-produced drama series 
entitled al-Shattat (“The Diaspora”), which is based on the controversial text known as the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a 19th-century publication that depicts a Zionist conspiracy to 
take over the world.60 Scenes from the multipart miniseries include a dramatization of a Rabbi 
slaying a young boy in order to make Passover matzoh.61 Another episode includes a scene 
depicting a secret Jewish government allegedly plotting to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, 
Japan. The transmission of this series caused uproar in France, where incitement to racial hatred 
and anti-Semitism is a criminal offence, and led France’s higher audiovisual authority to instruct 
al-Manar to change the tone of its programming or face a ban. However, when in December 
2004 a guest on a live show said that Zionists were deliberately trying to spread diseases, 
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including AIDS, to Arabs, the authority decided to take the station to court. On 6 January 2005, 
France’s highest administrative court, the Conseil d'État (Council of State)—which had 
jurisdiction over the channel because it broadcast via a satellite based in France—decided that 
the programs al-Manar broadcast “were in a militant context, with anti-semitic connotations” and 
banned transmission of the station, warning the satellite provider Eutelsat that if it failed to stop 
broadcasting al-Manar on its satellite within 48 hours of the decision it would be liable for 
payment of a fine of €5,000 (U.S.$6,600) for every day it broadcast the station over the 
deadline.62 For its part, the station said it was unfair to ban a channel on the basis of one live 
caller, and denies it is anti-Semitic.63 In the event, al-Manar voluntarily stopped broadcasting 
several days before the ban was to take effect, a move that prevented other stations on the same 
satellite network from being removed from the airwaves as well, a decision that won the station 
praise from other networks and its international viewers.64  
As regards the U.S. ban, which followed shortly thereafter: in George Bush’s 2004 State 
of the Union address, he mentioned Arab media outlets he claimed were responsible for 
disseminating “hateful propaganda” against the U.S.65 Certainly al-Manar was included by the 
U.S. administration in these ranks. In December 2004, al-Manar was placed on an “exclusion 
list” by the U.S. State Department. This was followed up in March 2006 with al-Manar’s 
designation as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.66 As a result, no 
one associated with the broadcaster is allowed entry to the U.S. and any U.S. company found to 
be doing business with al-Manar will be subject to sanctions and possible prosecution with the 
result that al-Manar is prohibited from transmitting in the United States. Although they result in 
the same outcomes, it’s worth noting that the French and U.S. bans rest on different legal 
foundations, with the French ban focusing on constitutional issues of expression, and the U.S. 
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ban based on laws prohibiting the material support of terrorist organizations, which, according to 
Yadav, means that “At least in theory, then, the U.S. is suggesting that their own struggle against 
al-Manar is not based on the substance of what it says, but rather on what it does.”67 In addition 
to being unavailable in North America, and with access being restricted in Europe, al-Manar is 
also no longer available for viewing in South America, nor in Australia or much of Africa; 
however, it is still broadcast throughout the Middle East, parts of Europe, and North Africa by 
Nilesat, whose major shareholder is the government of Egypt, and Arabsat, which is owned in 
part by the government of Saudi Arabia.  
 
Responses to Ban(s) 
Unsurprisingly, al-Manar officials were some of the most vociferous critics of the ban. The 
station responded in a statement that the U.S. action amounted to “intellectual terrorism” and an 
attack on press freedom.68 They also complained about the timing of the U.S. ban, pointing out 
that they had been broadcasting by satellite since 2000, and Hizbollah has been categorized as a 
terrorist organization by the United States since 1997, and questioning why the U.S. banning 
arrived on the heels of events in France, and insinuating conspiracy.69 In Lebanon more widely, 
the mood was one of defiance. In response to the French ban, 50 cable operators in Beirut halted 
transmission of the French station TV5.
 
The Lebanese Minister of Information declared the ban 
proof of censorship of any opposition to Israel, and students demonstrated in support of al-
Manar.
 
The then Lebanese Foreign Minister Mahmud Hammud commented “we consider this to 
be against the freedom of expression that the entire world including the EU demands. We believe 
this attitude is not in harmony with the call for freedom of expression these countries advocate, 
and we believe there is a contradiction.”70 The banning was also criticized by organizations 
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ranging from Hamas71 and Palestinian Islamic Jihad72 to Reporters Without Borders, with the 
latter warning against confusing anti-Israeli positions with anti-Semitism.73 In any event, the 
station has also all but entirely circumvented the ban(s) by providing continuous live streaming 
online.  
 
Al-Manar’s Role in the 2006 Crisis 
Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and believing itself relatively safe from the 
threat of Israeli aerial bombardment, al-Manar invested in high-specification antennas, which 
allowed it to extend its broadcasts further into Israel. As a result, residents of Haifa, Israel’s third 
largest city—which is located some 30 miles from the Lebanese border—are now in range of al-
Manar’s transmissions. According to Ron Schliefer, discussing the spots in Hebrew described 
earlier, “beyond their specific verbal messages these transmissions also seek to create in the 
Israeli mind a frightening connection between Al-Manar’s ability to target their television sets 
and Hizbollah’s ability to shell their homes; the implication being that the range of the one is 
equal to the range of the other.”74 Interestingly, al-Manar’s headquarters in Haret Hreik and the 
above-mentioned antennas—one of which was located near Baalbek, northeast of Beirut, and 
another in Maroun al-Ras in southern Lebanon75—were some of the first targets of IDF air 
attacks when hostilities erupted between Israel and Hizbollah in early July 2006. Al-Manar’s 
Beirut headquarters was first struck by the Israeli Air Force on Thursday, 13 July, the second day 
of the crisis. The complex was bombed again on July 16, resulting in the outbreak of a fire in the 
station and surrounding buildings. Although the station’s broadcasts continued uninterrupted 
during the first attack—which severely damaged the upper stories of the building—the second 
attack caused the station’s signal to be briefly unavailable on several occasions before returning 
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to full strength.76 Also, on the second day of the crisis, the first-ever Hizbollah rocket attacks on 
Haifa commenced.  
The Israeli bombing of Hizbollah’s media outlets received harsh criticism from 
journalistic and human rights organizations worldwide. The Committee to Protect Journalists, the 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Human Rights Watch, and others agreed that the 
attacks were a violation of international law, as the station’s broadcasts were not serving any 
direct military function (e.g., sending military communiqués).77 Aidan White, the IFJ’s General 
Secretary, said: “The bombing of Al-Manar is a clear demonstration that Israel has a policy of 
using violence to silence media it does not agree with. This action means media can become 
routine targets in every conflict. It is a strategy that spells catastrophe for press freedom and 
should never be endorsed by a government that calls itself democratic.”78 Human Rights Watch 
agreed, insisting “that Lebanese civilian opinion might influence how the Lebanese government 
responds to Hizbollah is not a sufficiently direct contribution to military action to render the 
media used to influence that opinion a legitimate military target. Rather, broadcasts should be 
met with competing broadcasts, propaganda with propaganda.”79  
 Indeed the IDF—in addition to conventional attacks on media targets in Lebanon—is also 
said to have broadened its psyop activities over the course of the crisis. The first reports of 
intercepts of al-Manar’s satellite transmissions were carried by Egypt’s Middle East News 
Agency, who said that on Sunday, 23 July Israel managed “to intercept the satellite transmissions 
of Hizbollah’s al-Manar TV channel for the third successive day, replacing it with Israeli 
transmissions that reportedly showed Hizbollah command sites and rocket launching pads which 
Israel claimed it has raided.”80 A little over a week later, al-Jazeera reported that a series of still 
photos with captions appeared on the screen’s of al-Manar viewers for several minutes during the 
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evening news. Al-Jazeera attributed the interruption to “Israeli-backed hackers.” One of the 
images showed the corpse of a khaki-clad man lying face-down with accompanying Arabic text 
reading: “This is the photograph of a body of a member of Hizbollah’s special forces. Nasrallah 
lies: it is not us that is hiding our losses.” The al-Jazeera report is also accompanied by what 
appears to be a screen shot which shows a photograph of Nasrollah accompanied by the text 
“member of Hizbollah: watch out,” which they say also appeared on TV screens.81  
 
Conclusion 
Al-Manar has, since its inception, been a television station devoted to prioritizing the goals of 
Hizbollah and although these have been subject to change over time, the overarching theme of 
resistance has persisted throughout. From its establishment in 1991 to the Israeli withdrawal 
from the south in 2000, the bulk of the station’s programming was aimed at sustaining and, if 
possible, strengthening the Lebanese public’s support for Hizbollah’s campaign of resistance 
again the IDF in south Lebanon, while at the same time pressuring Israeli viewers to push their 
government for a unilateral withdrawal. The eventual withdrawal was celebrated live on air for 
days, but this “triumph” came tinged with distress: what was to be the station’s purpose without 
the “hook” the resistance provided? The answer presented itself in the form of the outbreak of 
the so-called al-Aqsa Intifada. Al-Manar became “the secret weapon of the Palestinian intifada 
against Israeli occupation, the loyal supporter of armed resistance, devoting at least half its 24-
hour-a-day satellite broadcasting to the battle between Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank 
and Gaza.”82 In the summer of 2006, circumstances changed again, however, and al-Manar 
reverted to its original role as mouthpiece of the Lebanese resistance; although this time around 
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the Israelis, cognizant of the role played by al-Manar in the previous conflict, quickly sought to 
neutralize the station, they had little success.  
 Between 1991 and 2006, other changes also occurred at the station. From a small local 
effort, the station grew to encompass a satellite audience of millions worldwide. This success 
was somewhat short-lived, however, as the station came to be banned in numerous jurisdictions 
around the world as a result of the anti-semitic nature of some of its content. The bans were 
applauded by many, but excoriated by others. The U.S. ban was likely ill-advised because by 
blocking al-Manar’s transmission, Washington not only increased the station’s notoriety and thus 
popularity, but also ignored political logic which upholds interests. Unfortunately for the U.S. 
and its interest in reaching out to the “Arab street,” the likelihood is that the Chairman of 
Hizbollah’s Executive Committee, Hashim Safiy-al-Din, summed up the feelings of a great many 
people in the Arab world when he said about the ban: 
 [T]his impudent attack against our rights, with all their media, political, cultural and 
economic dimensions, is not a sign of strength but a sign of the U.S. weakness and 
powerlessness. By doing this it has proved its tyranny and oppression, which we have 
been talking about…[T]he U.S.A. is talking about democracy and freedom of speech, but 
at the same time it cannot tolerate a sound or an image despite all the media it has 
available throughout the world.83 
 
 
On a more practical level, the goal of making al-Manar unavailable to large numbers of people 
worldwide was translated into an own-goal when, almost immediately on the announcement of 
the bans, the station commenced live online streaming. Eventually, this may mean that the 
station will draw more viewers via their freely available Internet service than via more costly 
satellite connections. 




The most comprehensive exploration of the al-Manar phenomenon to date was produced by Avi 
Jorisch of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His Beacon of Hatred: Inside 
Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
2004) is, as the name suggests, an unalloyed critique of the station. Anne Marie Baylouny’s more 
recent article, ‘Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,’ which is 
available for free download from 
http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Special/csrc_mpf.2005-10-17.5799702381/05(49).pdf, 
adopts a more even-handed approach. Al-Manar’s official website is online at 
http://www.almanar.com.lb/ with both Arabic and English versions. Live streaming of 
programming may be accessed at http://www.almanar.com.lb/live.htm; this is largely in Arabic, 
but the station also periodically broadcasts news in English and French. An archive of the latter 
broadcasts is accessible online at http://www.islamicdigest.net/almanar/start.php. Finally, Jorisch 
currently heads up the Coalition Against Terrorist Media (CATM), whose website at 
http://www.stopterroristmedia.org/ also contains clips from al-Manar. (The same clips, and 
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